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NOTES
petitioner's injuries.57 This seems to indicate, then, that if a
crewman negligently injured a longshoreman instantaneously
even without bringing into play an antecedent condition, unsea-
worthiness would still be found, the condition being the negli-
gent seaman himself. The logical question then becomes why is
a longshoreman not a "seaman" at all times and for all purposes.
Surely if a longshoreman performs the duties traditionally
performed by seamen, the situation in Usner could be regarded
as one negligent "seaman"--an unseaworthy condition in him-
self-causing injury to another "seaman," and the shipowner
would be held liable under unseaworthiness. Such circuitous
logic is illustrative of the heretofore unrestrained reaches of
the unseaworthiness doctrine. It is submitted that the Court in
Usner was moved more by considerations of equitable treatment
for the shipowner who has no control over the competence of
stevedoress rather than by the technical requirements of its
frequently unwieldy doctrine of unseaworthiness. 59 However
limited its application might be, it is hoped that the decision in
Usner reflects a tendency toward a more practical approach to
the problem of unseaworthiness when longshoremen are in-
volved.
James Louis Williams, IV
PAROL EVIDENCE USED TO SHOW LACK OF AUTHENTICITY
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY EXECUTORY PROCESS
Plaintiff petitioned for seizure of immovable property owned
by defendant to foreclose, via executory process, on a conven-
tional mortgage evidenced by notarial act in authentic form.
Defendant sought to enjoin the executory proceeding for insuffi-
57. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. However, to base a deci-
sion merely on the fact that a shipowner has no control over stevedores fur-
nished to load and unload his cargo would have meant the overruling of the
Court's prior cases holding such lack of control not to be a defense at the
shipowner's disposal in attempting to disprove unseaworthiness. In such
instances the shipowner does have an opportunity to obtain indemnification
from the stevedoring contractor.
59. Perhaps the Court looked further than the immediate liability of the
shipowner. Had Luckenbach Overseas Corp. been held liable in this case, it
could have sued Usner's employer for indemnity for its failure to perform
in a "workmanlike manner." Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956). Thus, this decision may reflect a tendency to give limited
recognition to the heretofore circumvented protection given stevedoring com-
panies by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
197/11
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
ciency of authentic evidence.' The trial court, on the basis of
the parol evidence rule,2 refused to allow defendant to introduce
testimony that two witnesses were not present at the execution
of the mortgage.8 On first hearing, the court of appeal affirmed
the trial court, but reversed on rehearing and held, parol
evidence was admissible to prove that the two witnesses were
not present at the execution of the authentic act. Union Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. The Grand Co., 239 So.2d 395 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 256 La. 916, 240 So.2d 375 (1970).
The issues raised by the instant case involve the methods
of attacking the authentic act, the evidentiary rules pertaining
to it, and the nature of the act itself.4 The pith of Louisiana's
legislation concerning authentic acts is contained in Louisiana
Civil Code articles 2234 through 2239. 5 The original legislative
source of all but one of these articles is the Code Napoleon of
France.6 Historically, the emphasis on documentary evidence was
initiated in France during the sixteenth century.7 However, as
early as the middle ages, the inconvenience of oral proof and
1. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2573: "The original debtor, his surviving spouse
in community, heirs, legatees, and legal representative are not required to
furnish security for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or prelimi-
nary injunction to arrest a seizure and sale, when the injunctive relief is
applied for solely on one or more of the following grounds: ...
"(5) The order directing the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale was
rendered without sufficient authentic evidence having been submitted to the
court, or the evidence submitted was not actually authentic."
2. "An authentic act is full proof of the agreement contained in it ...
and parol evidence cannot be admitted against or beyond what it contained
therein nor on what may have been said before or at the time of making it
or since . . . in the absence of a specific averment of error, fraud, or am-
biguity .... ." Weysham v. Aiavolasiti, 227 So.2d 798, 800 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969). See also Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So.2d 737 (1953); Vial v. Moll,
37 La. Ann. 203 (1885); Colsson v. Consolidated Ass'n Bank, 12 La. 105 (1838).
3. The presence of two witnesses is required by LA. Cxv. CODE art. 2234:
"The authentic act, as relates to contracts, is that which has been executed
before a notary public . . .in the presence of two witnesses."
If an act is executed without the presence of two witnesses, the act is
not authentic. Pain v. Plicque & LeBeau, 10 La. 304 (1836); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Williams, 225 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969). See also
Cotton v. Washburn, 228 La. 832, 84 So.2d 208 (1955); Jackson v. Spearman,
188 La. 535, 177 So. 659 (1937); cf. Finance Sec. Co. v. Williams, 42 So.2d 902
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
4. The instant case raises indirect questions relating to requisites for
authenticity and estoppel. These collateral issues will be discussed in foot-
notes at the conclusion of this Note.
5. These articles are found in the chapter of the Civil Code dealing with
proof of obligations and they fall under the section of this chapter which
pertains to literal proof. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2234-39.
6. Only LA. Cxv. COns art. 2237 has no corresponding article in the Code
Napoleon. See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARciivEs 1220-24 (1942).
7. 2 PLANIoL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 1105 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
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the danger of false testimony were recognized.8 The invention
of the printing press and the spread of the knowledge of reading
and writing helped remedy these problems of inconvenience
and subornation, and consequently, in 1566 the Ordinance of
Moulin was enacted in France requiring that all acts, where
the value of the property exceeded a certain amount, be executed
before a notary or under private signature.9 The framers of the
French Civil Code expected documentary evidence to be the
most important means of proof, and, hence, they regulated the
various means of documentary proof, hoping to encourage the
preparation of contemporaneously constituted written proof
(preuve constitue) of as many transactions as possible.'0 The
framers especially encouraged the use of the authentic act by
making it public in nature" and by giving public acts advantages
over private acts.12 Furthermore, the veracity of public officers in
the execution of public acts was of such great public interest that
special procedures' 3 were enacted for proving forgeries. 4
A comparison of the authentic act of Louisiana to that of
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. P. HERzoG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE § 7.24 (1967).
11. In France authentic acts always have been of a public nature because
they have been drawn up by public officers who have the power to execute
public acts. The public officer's sincerity is insured by his training and quali-
fications, plus the terrible consequences in case of forgery on his part. 6
BEUDANT, COURS DM DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no. 975 (1906); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE nos. 80-81, 89 (La. St. L Inst. transl. 1959); 4 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL
FRANgAiS nos. 44-45, 56-58 (6th ed. 1848). Historically, conviction of a public
officer for a forgery entailed loss of his position and function, plus "convic-
tion to hard labor for life." 2 PLANIOL, Civa. LAW TRFATISE no. 90, at 57 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
12. The principal advantage of the public act was its conclusive proba-
tive effect in evidence as to all contained within the act, until it was proved
a forgery through the "inscription de faux." 6 BrUDANT, COURS DR DROIT CIVIL
FRANgSAi no. 997 (1906); 4 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS no. 66 (6th ed. 1848);
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 87-88, 90 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
13. There are two procedures for proving forgeries, inscription de faux
and faux incidental civil. The Inscription de faux is a criminal proceeding
In which the state is the prosecutor. When the criminal suit is instituted,
any civil suit concerning the act in question is suspended until a finding in
the criminal suit. A finding of forgery in the criminal suit is conclusive
evidence in the civil suit. The faux incidental civil is a civil proceeding
which arises where the procedure of inscription is recorded as an incident
to an action already commenced. P. HERZOG, CMvL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE §
7.44 (1967); 2 PLANIOL, CIVm LAW TREATISE nos. 83-85 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
14. The word "forgery" can mean either that the instrument has been
altered in its execution or that the draftsman made a false statement. P.
HERZOG, CIVrI PROCEDURE- IN FRANCE § 7.44 (1967); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
no. 86 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). For authority that the word "forgery"
has the same meaning in Louisiana in regard to authentic acts, see Succes-
sion of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852).
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France reveals an absence of Louisiana legislation specifying
the procedure by which one may assail the authentic act.15
Despite some early confusion, the Louisiana decisions recognize
that by alleging forgery one may directly attack an authentic
act.'8 In so attacking the act one may use parol evidence to
prove the act a forgery. 7
15. W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209 (1868); Succession of
Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852); Lewis' Heirs v. His Executor, 5 La. 387 (1833);
see also Succession of Block, 131 La. 101, 59 So. 29 (1912).
16. In 1833, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Lewis' Heirs v. His Exe-
cutor, 5 La. 387 (1833), noted the absence of positive legislation providing for
prosecutions of forgery. The court said that this Implied that no special
procedures were intended to be used in Louisiana for assailing authentic
acts. The court commented that by making proper allegations, a party could
introduce parol evidence and directly show that the act was invalid. In that
case the plaintiffs alleged that an authentic act was null because of the lack
of requisite legal formalities during the execution of the act. The court
found that this allegation authorized the plaintiff to introduce parol proof
of the informality. Three years later, In Pain v. Plicque & LeBeau, 10 La.
304 (1836), the supreme court allowed a notary and the two witnesses to an
authentic act to testify and prove by parol that the witnesses were not actu-
ally present at the execution of the act. Notwithstanding these decisions,
the supreme court decided In Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852), that
parol evidence could not be admitted to contradict a notary's recitals in an
authentic act and prove them false, when there was an objection to the
admission of the parol evidence. Succession of Tete has never been consid-
ered authoritative, however, because for unspecified reasons the court set
aside its opinion on rehearing. See Succession of Block, 131 La. 101, 59 So.
29 (1912); W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209 (1868). Subse-
quently, In Succession of Theriot, 114 La. 611, 38 So. 471 (1905), the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that parol evidence could be admitted to contradict
a notary's recitals in an authentic act and prove them false.
The procedure for attacking an authentic act is provided by LA. Civ.
CoDE art. 2236, which declares: "The authentic act is full proof of the agree-
ment contained in it . . . unless it be declared and proved a forgery." See
Succession of Block, 131 La. 101, 59 So. 29 (1912). Thus, It has been held
that when one assails the authentic act, he sues directly against the instru-
ment to have it annulled. Succession of Theriot, 114 La. 611, 38 So. 471 (1905);
W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209 (1868); Lewis' Heirs v. His
Executors, 5 La. 387 (1833); see also Succession of Block, 131 La. 101, 59 So.
29 (1912).
17. In assailing the act, one must distinguish the evidentiary rules appli-
cable when one attacks the form of the act-e.g., Succession of Tete, 7 La.
Ann. 95 (1852)-from those applicable when one attacks the agreement con-
tained in the act-e.g., W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209 (1868).
When one attacks the form of the act, the parol evidence rule is not appli-
cable because the parol evidence rule is intended to bar parties from disput-
ing their own declarations, not the notary's. Succession of Theriot, 114 La.
611, 38 So. 471 (1905). See also W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann.
209 (1868).
However, when one attacks the agreement contained in the authentic act,
he may be barred from contradicting or varying the recitals of the parties
to the act. Templet v. Babbit, 198 La. 810, 5 So.2d 13 (1941); see also note 2
8upra.
To reconcile the different grounds and evidentiary rules for attacking the
authentic act, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has construed the word "forg-
ery," as provided in LA. Civ. CoPs art. 2236, to Include the nuances of "false,"
Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852), and "fraud, error or force" within Its
meaning, Templet v. Babbit, 198 La. 810, 5 So.2d 13 (1941). The Work of the
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In Union Savings & Loan Ass'n v. The Grand Co.,' 8 the
court faced the problem of whether the parol evidence rule,
or any other evidentiary rule, was applicable to bar oral testi-
mony impeaching the notary's declarations contained in the
authentic act. Ordinarily, the parol evidence rule protects the
sanctity of the declarations of the parties, but here the defendant
attacked the form of the act, rather than the agreement con-
tained therein.19
On first hearing, the court decided that article 223820 con-
trolled the dispute.21 The court concluded that the declarations
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-The Parol Evidence Rule,
5 LA. L. Rzv. 269 (1943). Hence, one may attack an authentic act, if he
alleges it to be a "forgery," and one may use parol evidence to prove it a
"forgery." See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Williams, 225 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1969).
18. 239 So.2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
19. For a discussion of the evidentiary differences between attacking the
form and attacking the disposition of an act, see note 17 supra. The impor-
tance of attacking the form of the authentic act is that, in an executory
proceeding, the plaintiff must prove his right to use the executory process by
authentic evidence, LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2635, and by attacking the form of
the act, the defendant may be able to show a lack of the authentic evidence
necessary to justify the plaintiff's use of the executory process. Myrtle
Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So.2d 305 (1954); Raalte v. The
Congregation of the Mission, 39 La. Ann. 617, 2 So. 190 (1887); Miller, Lyon
& Co. v. Copell, 36 La. Ann 264 (1884); American Budget Plan, Inc. v. Small,
229 So.2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); see also General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So.2d 417 (1953).
If defendant can show that any link of evidence is not in authentic form,
he may enjoin the seizure and sale of his property. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts.
2751, 2753(5); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64
So.2d 417 (1953); American Budget Plan, Inc. v. Small, 229 So.2d 190 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Williams, 225 So.2d 717 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969).
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2238 provides: "An act, whether authentic or under
private signature, is proof between the parties, even of what is there
expressed only in enunciative terms, provided the enunciations have a direct
reference to the disposition.
"Enunciations foreign to the disposition, can serve only as a commence-
ment of proof."
21. In deciding that Civil Code article 2238 controlled the dispute, the
court rejected arguments by the defendant that LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2753(5)
made parol evidence admissible. The court held that Code of Civil Proce-
dure article 2753 did "not purport to establish the nature, sufficiency, or
admissibility of evidence establishing the alleged fact that the order of sei-
zure and sale was rendered on evidence not actually authentic. It merely
[provided] ... that [one] . . . may obtain the temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction on one or more of the listed grounds without fur-
nishing security for the issuance thereof." Union Say. & Loan Ass'n v. The
Grand Co., 239 So.2d 395, 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). This reasoning is sub-
stantiated by comment (b) to LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2753, which says: "(b) This
article merely regroups and broadens the grounds for the issuance of an
injunction to arrest the seizure and sale provided in Art. 739 of the 1870
Code"; and by comment (c) to the same article which says: "(c) ... in
1953 the supreme court again considered the question, and held that lack
of authentic evidence could be raised either under an application for injune-
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of the notary had a "direct reference to the disposition" of the
act, and therefore, they could not serve as a "commencement
of proof" under article 2238.22 The court's interpretation of
article 2238 was ingenious but opposite its traditional meaning.
The notary's declarations have never been considered as
"enunciations" within the meaning of article 2238, because the
"enunciations" provided for have always referred to the declara-
tions of the parties.2 Consequently, a "commencement of proof"
could be initiated only when the "enunciations" emanated from
the person against whom the action is brought.24
On rehearing the court reversed its original holding because
of a re-examination of Code of Civil Procedure article 2753, and
the court said that not only did its reconsideration of article
2753 compel a reversal of its holding, but it also caused a dif-
ferent interpretation of Civil Code article 2238.25
The writer suggests that the court's decision on rehearing
is erroneously based upon Code of Civil Procedure article 2753.
An examination of the purposes and history behind article 2753
indicates that the article was never intended to liberalize rules
pertaining to the nature, sufficiency, or admissibility of evi-
tive relief to arrest the seizure and sale, or under an appeal from the order
therefor. All cases to the contrary were again expressly overruled. General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So.2d 417 (1953), noted,
14 La. L. Rev. 289 (1953).
"The position taken by the Supreme Court in the Anzelmo case Is codi-
fied in this article."
In addition, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2751 provides for injunctive relief when
"the procedure required by law for an executory proceeding has not been
followed." Comment (d) to article 2751 provides: "(d) The provisions in
the above article permitting injunctive relief to arrest the seizure and sale
of the property in an executory proceeding when 'the procedure required by
law for an executory proceeding has not been followed' was inserted pri-
marily to make injunctive relief available to the defendant when the order
of seizure and sale was issued without sufficient authentic evidence. No
change in the law is made in this respect. See comment (b) under art.
2753 infra." The writer submits that the court's original holding that LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 2753 did not establish evidentiary rules was correct.
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2238. The "disposition" of the act has historically
referred to and meant the agreement contained within the act. See 2 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 94 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
23. See P. HERZOG, CIvIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE § 7.28(a) (1967); 2 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 94-95 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
24. See note 23 supra; Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
25. The court said: "We granted this rehearing primarily because we
wanted to reconsider the effect of L.S.A.-C.C.P. Art. 2753(5) in light of sub-
section (3) of that article." 239 So.2d 395, 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). After
reconsideration of this article, the court changed its position regarding LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 2753. The court said that this change caused it to reverse
Its interpretation of LA. CIV. CODE art. 2238: "As a result of these considera-
tions we also have changed our conclusion regarding the effect of Civil Code
Article 2238." 239 So.2d 395, 399 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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dence, but rather that it was intended merely to enlarge the
substantive grounds upon which an executory proceeding could
be enjoined.26 Moreover, the court's reliance on article 2753 was
unnecessary, because Louisiana courts consistently have allowed
parties to introduce parol evidence proving allegations that an
authentic act was not executed in compliance with Civil Code
article 2234.27 As is fraud,28 the false declarations of the notary are
included within the meaning of "forgery," as provided by Civil
Code article 2236,29 and allegations of false declarations by a
notary should entitle parties to introduce parol evidence, just
as do allegations of fraud.8 0
Because the authentic act of Louisiana can be attacked
directly and by use of parol evidence, one may question the
nature of Louisiana's authentic act. It is obviously not of such
a public and sacramental nature as the authentic act of France.81
However, it is a public act executed by a public officer,8 2 and,
since the notary is under a duty38 to execute the act veraciously,
the act is self-proving until proven a forgery. 84 This quasi-
sacramental nature of the authentic act of Louisiana has the
dual advantage of bringing stability to titles and agreements,85
while not giving undue probative force to written acts.8 6
26. See note 21 supra.
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2234; Succession of Theriot, 114 La. 611, 38 So. 471
(1905); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Williams, 225 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969); see also Succession of Cauvien, 46 La. Ann. 1412, 16 So. 309 (1894);
Pain v. Plicque & LeBeau, 10 La. 304 (1836); Finance Sec. Co. v. Williams, 42
So.2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949); Dainello v. McCoy, 131 So. 608 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1930).
28. See note 17 supra.
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2236.
30. Id.
31. For a discussion of the public nature of France's authentic act, see
notes 11-13 supra.
32. LA. R.S. 35:2 (1950) provides that all acts executed by notaries public,
in conformity with the provisions of LA. Civ. CODE art. 2234 shall be authentic
acts. See LA. R.S. 35:7-35:8 (1950) which provide that all acts executed
before a commissioned officer of the United States shall have the force and
effect of an authentic act. See also LA. R.S. 35:9 (1950) which provides that
acts executed in a foreign country before ambassadors and consular officials
shall have the force and effect of an authentic act and sections 452-453 of
the same title which provide that acts executed by any commissioner for the
State of Louisiana shall have the same force and effect of a notarial act.
33. Id. 35:198 provides that a notary shall be liable when he fails or
neglects to perform his duties.
34. Succession of Block, 131 La. 101, 59 So. 29 (1912).
35. Even though one may attack an authentic act and use parol evidence
by alleging the act is a forgery, his allegations will only be found true if
his evidence is "clear, cogent, and conclusive." See W. Cox & Co. v. King's
Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209, 212 (1868). This evidentiary burden aids in maintain-
ing the probative force of authentic acts, notwithstanding attacks by use of
parol evidence.
36. For authority that the notary's declarations should not have undue
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In conclusion, the result reached by the court in the instant
case is correct, but the court's reasoning should have been
grounded in Civil Code article 2236.87 The decision of the court
is especially desirable because it forces parties deriving advan-
tages from an authentic act either to comply fully with the
formalities required by law or to face the possibility of losing
these advantages. In the near future Louisiana appellate courts
may have an opportunity to clarify other problems relating to
attacks on authentic acts, such as what fulfills the requirements
of authenticitym and when should parties to an act be estopped
from disputing a notary's declarations.8
John C. Anderson
CoRPs OF ENGINEERS-NEw GUARDIANS OF ECOLOGY
Plaintiffs, riparian landowners, desired to fill a portion of
adjacent submerged lands owned by them in order to create
an island to be connected to the mainland by a bridge. The
landowners applied to the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers (hereinafter referred to as Corps) for a permit to dredge
and fill the affected navigable waters. Although the proposed
project was found to involve no adverse effects on navigation,
the Secretary of the Army (hereinafter referred to as Secretary)
denied the application on grounds of potential damage to fish
probative force, see Succession of Theriot, 114 La. 611, 38 So. 471 (1905);
W. Cox & Co. v. King's Estate, 20 La. Ann. 209 (1868); Lewis' Heirs v. His
Executors, 5 La. 387 (1833). For an argument that the agreement contained
in the authentic act should not have undue probative force, see Comment,
3 LA. L. REv. 427 (1941).
37. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2236; see also note 17 supra.
38. The instant case was remanded to the district court. Once the defen-
dant introduces parol evidence to substantiate his allegations that the two
witnesses were not present at the execution of the act, the district court will
have to decide whether there was substantial compliance with LA. Civ. CODE
art. 2234 in regard to what constitutes execution "in the presence of two
witnesses." See, e.g., Finance Sec. Co. v. Williams, 42 So.2d 902 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1949); cf. Abshire v. Comeaux, 159 La. 1087, 106 So. 574 (1925); Gen-
eral Fin. v. Warner, 169 So. 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936); Wessell v. Kite, 142
So. 363 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932); Dainello v. McCoy, 131 So. 608 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1930).
39. The district court, on remand, will also have to consider whether the
defendant should be estopped from contesting the validity of the authentic
act of mortgage because he later "cured" any defects of formality by his
action subsequent to the act's execution. Childs v. Pruitt, 196 La. 866, 875,
200 So. 282, 285 (1941); Reliance Homestead Ass'n v. Brink, 173 La. 331, 137
So. 52 (1931); cf. Monk v. Monk, 243 La. 429, 144 So.2d 384 (1962); Hodges v.
Long-Bell Petroleum, 240 La. 198, 121 So.2d 831 (1959); Snell v. Union Saw-
mill Co., 159 La. 604, 105 So. 728 (1925); Blanchard v. Allain, 5 La. Ann. 367
(1850).
